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ABSTRACT
Introduction: The objectives of this study were to compare
prevalence rates of different pathologies, ambulance system
and emergency department management times, and patient
survival and hazard ratios for codes 2 and 3 in two hub hos-
pitals in Modena in the 36-month period across the stages of
twomajor earthquakes in short sequence in Northern Italy in
2012.Methods: Clinical records pertaining to the emergency
care of patients were analyzed and only those assigned sta-
tus codes 2 and 3 by ambulance professionals were included
(if the assessment was confirmed by emergency department
triage). The statistical analysis of data was divided by three
time periods studied: before, during/between, and after the
earthquakes. Results: Among the 2,278 retained records,
there were no statistically significant differences in the preva-
lence of the main pathologies presented at the two hubs in
the studied period. A Cox regression model was used to
analyze the survival of patients in the different stages of
the emergency; there were no statistically significant differ-
ences in the hazard ratios of death before, during, and after
the earthquake. The study found a significant increase in
emergency department treatment times.Discussion: Redun-
dancies in the Modena medical system were found to have
compensated for damaged hospital facilities. In particular,
they helped emergency systems reorganize themselves faster
in order to bring medical assistance to people during and
around seismic events with as a minimal amount of disrup-
tion as possible. Conclusion: The Modena medical system
was redundant and ensured that disrupted emergency sys-
tems were reorganized and put back online while damaged
hospital facilities were compensated for/reproduced else-
where. Key words: earthquake; emergency response sys-
tem; performances; management times
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STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
 This study covers the entire population of code 2
and 3 patients that accessed the emergency system
during the catastrophe, which gives the analysis
strength.
 We used retrospective data that gives us no con-
trol over the homogeneity of the criteria used by the
emergency medical personnel in the evaluation of
the single cases.
BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2012, at 02.03 hours Coordinated Univer-
sal Time (UTC), the provinces of Modena and Ferrara
in Italy’s Emilia-Romagna region, as well as Mantua
in Lombardy, were hit by a local magnitude (LM) 5.9
earthquake. The 72 hours after the main shock were
characterized by a sequence of 300 small subsequent
seismic events. Then, on May 29 at 07.00 hours UTC,
therewas another large shock (5.8 LM), followed by 150
smaller shocks lasting until June 3 and intermittently
thereafter (1, 2). A state of emergency was declared on
May 22 to facilitate coordinated relief response.
The province ofModena has an area of 2690 km2 with
a population of 700,918 residents as of 2014; it is crossed
by the main Italian highway, the E45. An important
biomedical industrial district, producing roughly 1/3
of renal replacement therapy supplies used globally, is
located in the northern part of the province, near the
epicenters of both earthquakes: it suffered substantial
damage in the quakes.
From a social, economic, and logistic impact point
of view: 70% of the residential buildings in the crater
were not habitable, 1,777 individuals with high level
disability had to be evacuated from their homes (3).
Structural damages have been estimated at €2.07 bil-
lion, with 25,874 workers from 2,414 companies that
received temporary unemployment benefits.
There were eight hospitals active in the province
at the time of the first shock: two hubs (Policlinico
Hospital and Nuovo Ospedale S. Agostino Estense, or
NOCSAE), located in the city of Modena at the cen-
ter of the province, and six spokes, three (Sassuolo,
Pavullo, and Vignola) in the south and three (Carpi,
Mirandola, and Finale Emilia) in the north within the
seismic crater.
NOCSAE, a 400-bed hospital with a trauma cen-
ter, was not significantly damaged by the earthquakes
due to its more recent construction and adoption of
the most modern antiseismic technologies, while Poli-
clinico, an older building active since 1963, was sub-
stantially involved, losing 1/3 of its 600-bed capacity,
including pediatric and ob-gyn facilities. The northern
hospitals of Carpi, Mirandola, and Finale Emilia were
evacuated on themorning ofMay 20 and again onMay
29, and the 260 patients there relocated. In all, a total of
619 patients were evacuated from damaged hospitals
to other facilities in the region, to which can be added
2,120 elderly and physically disabled.
Figure 1 shows the reorganization of the hospital
system of the Province of Modena during the seismic
sequence of 2012.
This catastrophe also led to the death of 27 people
and wounded 397; deaths were caused mostly by the
collapse of industrial buildings.
Catastrophes are events that challenge the respon-
siveness and effectiveness of a territory’smedical emer-
gency response system by saturating its capacity and
damaging its facilities. Consequently, it is vital to study
the reaction of these systems to catastrophic events in
order to identify criticalities and strengths, especially
in relation to time-sensitive processes that require full
functionality of key elements in the chain of survival,
whichmakes these processes reliable and accurate indi-
cators of the overall status of the system (4–8).
Emergency response time has been considered by
Nehme and colleagues (9) a leadingmeasure of the sys-
tem’s performance in developed countries. In another
work by Cortez and colleagues (10) in evaluating the
clinical differences between two sets of ambulance
teams time was selected as objective measure of their
interventions. Moreover, in a recently published paper
(11), time was the primary outcome measure to assess
the association between bystander resuscitation and
survival.
As a result we selected the total management time,
from ambulance dispatch to hospital referral (arrival
time of the ambulance to the hospital), as a measure
of the performance of the emergency medical response
in the Province of Modena before, during and after the
seismic events of 2012. A natural disaster, in fact, has
the potential of disrupting the healthcare infrastruc-
ture significantly reducing the operative capacity of a
system.
The primary objective of this study was to compare
the management times for ambulance system codes 2
and 3 in the 36-month period across the earthquake.
METHODS
Data and Sample
After approval by the Institutional Ethics Committee
(Comitato Etico Provinciale diModena), this retrospec-
tive observational investigation was conducted on all
patients managed by the Ambulance Service of the
Province of Modena (118 Modena Soccorso) and the
emergency departments of NOCSAE and Policlinico
Hospital.
All clinical records pertaining to the emergency care
of these patients were analyzed; only records assigned
status codes 2 and 3 by the ambulance professionals,
and where this assessment was confirmed by emer-
gency department triage, were included (see Figure 2,
the enrollment flow chart).
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FIGURE 1. A map of the Province of Modena (Italy). The area marked in red was more severely damaged by the seismic sequence of 2012.
Arrows show the reorganization of the hospital systemduring the catastrophe. ©Alberto Barbieri. Reproduced by permission ofAlberto Barbieri.
Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.
Coding
In the Italian out-of-hospital emergency response sys-
tem, named “118” after the emergency telephone num-
ber one dials to activate it, emergency professionals
assign each patient a status code according to clini-
cal severity: code 1 refers to a stable patient, where no
rapid transport to hospital is required; code 2 groups
all subjects who require referral to the emergency
department; code 3 implies a life-threatening condi-
tion, which requires immediate admission to the emer-
gency department; and code 4 refers to the death of
the patient. Among, code 2s, due to their intermedi-
ate severity, further selection was conducted in order
to identify only those who required advanced medical
care, in particular patients who:
 Received  8 L/min of oxygen
 Required supraglottic devices; or
 Required other advanced airway management
techniques.
Survival information was obtained from official
hospital registries and patients were divided in the
following categories according to their survival time:
24 and 72 hours; 7, 15, 30, 60, 75, 90, 180, and 365 days.
Intervention times were calculated based on dispatch
time and admission time to target emergency depart-
ment, from ambulance and hospital records. This
sample does not include patients with direct access
without Emergency Room. The emergency department
admission diagnosis was also noted.
Clinical variables (Cardiac arrest, Polytrauma, Trau-
matic brain injury, Myocardial infarction, Cardiac fail-
ure, Respiratory failure, Stroke, Septic shock) were
recorded to identify whether the earthquake changed
the case mix to reduce possible sources of bias.
Data regarding the number of civilians evacuated
to emergency shelters due to extensive damage suf-
fered by their homes and data regarding loss of bed
capacity at hospitals were considered as measures of
the severity of infrastructure compromise due to the
earthquake.
Patients were initially divided into five groups
according to the phase in which they contacted the
emergency system:
 Pre-earthquake: January 1, 2011 to May 19, 2012
(phase 0)
 Earthquake: May 20 to May 29, 2012 (phase 1)
 Immediate aftermath: June and July 2012 (phase 2)
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FIGURE 2. Enrollment flow chart: Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
 Early reorganization: August to October 2012
(phase 3)
 Normalization: November 2012 to December 2013
(phase 4)
In order to facilitate the analysis of mortality and
intervention times, common characteristics were iden-
tified in the aforementioned phases and the study
cohort was divided into three stages:
 Pre-earthquake (0): January 1, 2011 to May 19, 2012
(it includes phase 0)
 Earthquake (1): May 20 to November 3, 2012, when
the Italian Red Cross declared the earthquake emer-
gency over (it includes phase 1, 2 and 3)
 Post-earthquake (2): November 4, 2012, to December
31, 2013 (it includes phase 4)
Stage 0 represents pre-earthquake normal function-
ality, and stage 1 includes the whole management of
the seismic emergency, while stage 2 covers the return
to a new normal functionality. Figure 3 summarizes
the temporal succession of phases and stages and their
correlation.
All data were recorded in a digital database created
specifically for the purpose.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed with Stata software (StataCorp,
College Station, TX, USA). The Student’s t-test was
used for continuous variables, ANOVA to compare
continuous variables among groups, paired Wilcoxon
signed-rank test for longitudinal variables over time,
and Cox regression model to study survival. All differ-
ences with p-values0.05 were considered statistically
significant.
RESULTS
Characteristics of Study Subjects
A total of 2,278 patients presenting at Policlinico and
NOCSAE in all phases (i.e., January 2011 to December
2013) were included in the study. Table 1 summarizes
the referral rates of code 3s and code 2s to each emer-
gency department.
As shown in Table 2, there were only a statistically
significant differences in the prevalence of the main
pathologies presenting at the two hubs in the studied
period (as identified by theWilcoxon signed-rank test):
Stage 0 has a lower incidence than Stage 2, p-value
0.028.
Main Results of the Analyses
A Cox regression model was used to analyze the sur-
vival of patients through the different stages of the
emergency and surrounding period. Therewere no sta-
tistically significant differences in the hazard ratios of
death before, during, and after the earthquake. Figure 4
shows the Kaplan–Meier survival estimate curves for
this event.
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FIGURE 3. Temporal succession of phases and stages of the study. Phases: Pre-earthquake – from January 1, 2011 to May 19, 2012 – (phase 0),
Earthquake – May 20 – May 29, 2012 – (phase 1), Immediate aftermath – June and July 2012 – (phase 2), Early reorganization – from August to
October 2012 – (phase 3), Normalization – from November 2012 to December 2013 (phase 4); Stages: Pre-earthquake (0) – from January 1, 2011
to May 19, 2012 – (it includes phase 0), Earthquake (1) – from May 20 to November 3, 2012, when the Italian Red Cross declared the earthquake
emergency over (it includes phase 1, 2 and 3), Post-earthquake (2) – from November 4, 2012, to December 31, 2013 (it includes phase 4).
The earthquake shifted the balance of patients
referred to each hub hospital (before the earthquake
almost evenly split between the two centers) toward
NOCSAE,which thus had a higherworkload than Poli-
clinico after the earthquake. Table 3 shows the percent-
ages of code 2 and 3 patients taken to each hospital
before and after the emergency. Therewas a statistically
significant increase in the number of patients treated by
the NOCSAE hospital and a corresponding decrease at
Policlinico Hospital.
Table 4 takes into consideration the average refer-
ral times to each hub center by the Ambulance Ser-
vice and the emergency department treatment times
for all stages of the earthquake emergency. Although
there was no significant variation in ambulance times,
there was a significant increase in emergency depart-
ment treatment times.
DISCUSSION
This study highlights a peculiar aspect of the 2012
earthquake as it affected health services in Modena:
there was no surge in emergency department admis-
sions during the emergency or in the following days.
The two major seismic events under consideration,
in fact, had low mortality rates when compared to
prior earthquake disasters in Italy (e.g., in Irpinia and
Molise) and, since the disaster discussed herein, in
Table 1. Referral rates for status codes 2 and 3 to Nuovo Ospedale S. Agostino Estense (NOCSAE) and Policlinico hub
hospitals from January 2011 to December 2013.
Phase Duration (Days) Total Events NOCSAE Events Events/day Nocsae Percentage Policlinico Events Events/day Policlinico Percentage
0 505 1073 630 1.25 58.71 443 0.88 41.29
1 9 22 10 1.11 45.45 12 1.33 54.55
2 62 133 83 1.34 62.41 50 0.81 37.59
3 97 179 120 1.24 67.04 59 0.61 32.96
4 422 871,00 558 1.32 64.06 313 0.74 35.94
The studied period was subdivided into 5 consecutive time phases: 0, before the earthquake; 1, during the earthquake; 2, in the immediate aftermath; 3, in the late
summer early autumn of 2012; and 4, from November 2012 to December 2013.
Table 2. Case mix of admissions by stage: before the earthquake 0, during the earthquake 1, after the earthquake 2.
Pathologies Stage 0 Percentage Stage 1 Percentage Stage 2 Percentage total Percentage
Cardiac arrest 107 9.97 40 12.01 102 11.70 249 10.93
Polytrauma 132 12.30 48 14.41 107 12.27 287 12.60
Traumatic brain injury 137 12.77 40 12.01 106 12.16 283 12.42
Myocardial infarction 40 3.73 10 3.00 38 4.36 88 3.86
Cardiac failure 226 21.06 71 21.32 193 22.13 490 21.51
Respiratory failure 450 41.94 139 41.74 412 47.25 1001 43.94
Stroke 77 7.18 19 5.71 64 7.34 160 7.02
Septic shock 58 5.41 18 5.41 57 6.54 133 5.84
Other 202 18.83 73 21.92 195 22.36 470 20.63
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FIGURE 4. Kaplan–Meier survival estimate curves for survival
before, during, and after the earthquake emergency (stages 0, 1, and
2, respectively). Figure reports hazard ratios and p-values.
Table 3. Percentages of code 2 and 3 patients taken to each
hospital before and after the earthquake.
Stage Policlinico NOCSAE Total
0 453 (51.65%) 638 (45.54%) 1091 (47.89%)
1 and 2 424 (48.35%) 763 (54.46%) 1187 (52.11%)
Total 877 1401 2,278
p-value 0.004
Analysis performed using chi-squared test.
Amatrice, Accumoli, Pescara del Tronto, and the entire
central Italy. The 27 deaths were caused by the collapse
of buildings, mainly industrial facilities; however, the
vast majority of structures, albeit often severely dam-
aged, allowed the evacuation of the occupants to safe
zones (12–14).
The main impacts of this earthquake were social,
economic, and logistic: the populations of the towns
located within the crater found themselves without
homes at the beginning of a very warm season and
mostly without jobs as well, as most industrial sites
suffered blocks or delays to their activities; they also
lacked medical services, since as mentioned, the spoke
facilities at Carpi, Mirandola, and Finale Emilia have
been taken out of commission (15).
Due to the peculiar characteristics of this natural dis-
aster, with low mortality rates and higher infrastruc-
ture damages, it was necessary to measure the impact
of the seismic events on the emergency response sys-
tem with a more sensitive method: the management
time of a case, from ambulance dispatch to hospital
referral, can be considered a measure of the system’s
operative capacity, as already demonstrated in similar
contexts (9–11).
Data suggest that before the earthquake, the man-
agement of code 2 and 3 cases was evenly divided
between the two hub hospitals; whereas, after the
second shock, on May 29, there was a steady rise in
emergency department admissions at NOCSAE. This
catastrophe has led to the reorganization of the local
healthcare system to rely progressively more on the
hub that was less involved in the seismic event, which
is likely one of the key factors in keeping mortality and
performance stable (16–19).
While the ambulance system was largely untouched
by the earthquake, as shown by the unchanged inter-
vention times, the reorganization of services that
diverted a larger flow of code 2 and 3 patients to
NOCSAE slightly lengthened emergency department
treatment times. In fact, before the earthquakes, spoke
hospitals received code 2 and 3 from their respective
territories while afterward this traffic was diverted
toward Policlinico and especially NOCSAE, as Poli-
clinico was damaged.
Ambulance intervention times did not change sig-
nificantly during the Stage 1, as much of the evacua-
tionwas carried out by dedicated rescue personnel that
were not involved in themanagement of medical prob-
lems. There was a prompt response by Civil Protec-
tion, Army, Scouts, Veterans association, RedCross that
shared the burden of aiding civilians leaving ambu-
lances, and medical personnel only for health-related
issues. Moreover, roads weremostly intact andmore in
general, being a densely populated industrial region,
in case a roadway was blocked alternative routes
could easily be identified. Ambulance referral times,
Table 4. Ambulance referral times (ES) and emergency department treatment times (ED) in each hub hospital during the
phases of the earthquake emergency including first line life-saving treatments and diagnostic procedures.
Stage Policlinico obs Mean time ES St.er NOCSAE obs Mean time ES St.er
0 415 46.78 4.90 608 4.14
1 114 37.92 4.59 201 43.27 5.87
2 297 47.14 6.55 528 45.80 4.73
p-value 0.6693 0.9376
Stage Policlinico obs Mean time ED St.er NOCSAE obs Mean time ED St. er
0 280 293.18 17.80 413 334.12 14.19
1 65 414.80 40.40 121 411.48 27.26
2 159 412.77 24.16 317 443.77 24.16
p-value 0.0001∗ 0.0000∗
Policlinico obs and NOCSAE obs refer to the number of patients admitted to/treated by Policlinico and NOCSAE with codes 2 and 3. St.er - Standard error.
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moreover, did not increase significantly due to a likely
reduction of the commercial vehicular traffic in the
earthquake crater, which may have compensated the
longer distances that had to be covered by the ambu-
lances. The effect of the closure of spoke hospitals can
be seen in the longer emergency department times,
which accounts for the higher workload the two hub
hospitals had to bear during the emergency.
Although the economic and social consequences of
the earthquakes of 2012 in Emilia-Romagna were last-
ing and severe, the number of injured and killed was,
fortunately, relatively low. The Kaplan–Meier survival
estimate shows that there was no rise in mortality cor-
related with the seismic events of May 2011, because
most of the collapses involved industrial buildings that
at the time of the shocks were, in the large majority of
cases, either empty or already evacuated. The health-
care system responded adequately, providing continu-
ity in essential services and maintaining the same level
of performance as before the event.
As the present results show, placing two hubs in a
heavily populated territory and allowing for a certain
degree of flexibility such that one can take over in case
the other is damaged is a possible strategy to limit
the consequences of such catastrophes. In this regard,
the geographical placement of the hubs is important
in order to minimize the chance of damage to both
facilities.
Redundancy is a well-known principle in the design
of intrinsically safe devices, but it comes at the price of
having to invest resources in not-directly-needed repli-
cation of similar structures in two different portions of
the same systemand establishing a standard set of rules
for their activation. The healthcare system can be, to
a certain extent, considered a very complex—possibly
the most complex—medical device, and redundancy
has to be considered when planning for essential struc-
tures in densely populated areas (20–25).
Cost concerns often limit the degree to which this
approach can be applied, however, making a system
less resilient to unpredictable events. One possible
approach to increasing the adaptability of systems in
this context is investing in a form of flexible redun-
dancy, where multipurpose facilities can be easily con-
verted to a needed function with minimal effort. NOC-
SAE and Policlinico developed in tandem along these
lines into a Gestalt system, with an essentially different
mix of departments that share a common core around
basic health needs (26).
One critical point in terms of this division of func-
tions is the fact that Policlinico, which has the only
neonatal intensive care unit in the province, also has
maternal and child health departments, which are
duplicated at the centers of Carpi, Mirandola and Sas-
suolo (i.e., both in the north, within the seismic crater,
and in the south). Duplicating these services multiple
times in the same territory may be impractical not only
due to cost, but also due to the high level of speci-
ficity of these specializations. The risk of a medical sys-
tem’s involvement in a catastrophe greatly degrading
its ability to provide health services can be mitigated
by creating regional networks for the smooth referral of
patients should one center be rendered largely or com-
pletely inoperative (27).
Another preventive measure is the hardening of
structures to make them more resistant in case of
earthquake. Policlinico hospital is a large complex of
buildings that has been constantly growing since 1963,
year of its opening. Renovation works were already in
progress when the earthquake struck and were essen-
tial in preventing further damages. Structural safety of
older buildings is a complex challenge, especially in
contexts where critical society functions are located in
facilities built when safety criteria were significantly
different.
A limitation is the fact that hospital data was used to
assessmortality, whichmay bias the estimate because it
fails to identify community deaths that did not contact
the emergency response system.
Another limitation of this studywas by not including
codes 1 and 4 in the analysis, because their sheer num-
ber can saturate the treatment capacity of an emergency
department during a catastrophe distracting precious
resources from codes 2 and 3. Systems for the assess-
ment of mass casualties can in such circumstances help
healthcare personnel prioritize cases. Fortunately, the
2012 earthquake had a low mortality; therefore, no
mass casualty scenario arose.
However, in this regard, it is also important to note
that Policlinico managed to reorganize its structures
in the aftermath of the 2012 earthquakes to ensure
adequate service, even if most of its structures were
damaged. Renovation and structural hardening of Poli-
clinico are currently in the process to ensure optimal
safety for patients; most departments have experi-
enced a reduction of beds. NOCSAE and Policlinico
have merged at the end of 2016 from a management
standpoint while maintaining their independence as
structures.
The Carpi Hospital, main spoke facility, that served
the northern part of the province, reopened the first
departments 85 days after the earthquake and pro-
gressively returned to normal activity in the follow-
ing months. An advanced medical post had been acti-
vated soon after the event to treat immediate casualties.
TheMirandolaHospital reactivated theA&E andRadi-
ology departments after approximately 45 days. The
Finale Emilia Hospital was reopened approximately
one year after the earthquake as an outpatient facility.
Finally, in considering the results of this study
we should remember that, luckily, Emilia-Romagna’s
earthquake was different from other more catastrophic
earthquakes in recent years, such as Irpinia, Abruzzo,
and recently Amatrice, Accumoli, and Pescara del
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Tronto: it had relatively lowmortality, even as it under-
mined the provincial infrastructure in Modena, espe-
cially buildings, industry, and hospitals. The Modena
medical system was redundant and ensured that dis-
rupted emergency systems were reorganized and put
back online while damaged hospital facilities were
compensated for/reproduced elsewhere. This is fortu-
nate, as human lives are not redundant.
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